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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§78-2a-3(2)Q)(2001). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of the issues on appeal involves the interpretation of the 
following statutory provisions: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-60 (2001). Nuisances. 
They [municipal legislative bodies] may declare what shall be a nuisance, 
and abate the same, and impose fines upon persons who may create, continue 
or suffer nuisances to exist. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-76 (2001). Noise abatement—Street performances. 
They [municipal legislative bodies] may prevent the ringing of bells, 
blowing of horns and bugles, crying of goods by auctioneers and others, and 
the making of other noises, for the purpose of business, amusement or 
otherwise, and prevent all performances and devices tending to the collection 
of persons on the streets or sidewalks of the city. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-803(1) (2001). Public nuisance defined. 
(1) A public nuisance is a crime against the order and economy of the state 
and consists in unlawfully doing any act or omitting to perform any duty, 
which act or omission: 
(a) annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety 
of three or more persons; 
(b) offends public decency; 
(c) unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, or 
renders dangerous for passage, any lake, stream, canal, or basin, or 
any public park, square, street, or highway; 
(d) is a nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9; or 
- i -
(e) in any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use 
of property. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-38-1(1) (2001). Nuisance defined. 
(1) A nuisance is anything which is injurious to health, indecent, offensive to 
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere 
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property. A nuisance may be 
the subject of an action. 
RULE 56(C), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
(c) . . . The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Ronald R. Whaley and Melanie Reif shall collectively 
be referred to herein as "Whaley/Reif' and individually as "Whaley" or "Reif." 
Defendant/Appellee Park City Municipal Corporation shall be referred to 
herein as "Park City." 
Defendant/Appellee Randy Barton d/b/a The Wooden Dog shall be referred 
to herein as "Barton." 
Defendant/Appellee Mountain Town Stages shall be referred to herein as 
"MTS." 
Defendant/Appellee Park City/Summit County Arts Council shall be referred 
to herein as "Arts Council." 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Barton, MTS and Arts Council hereby concur in and incorporate by 
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reference the Statement of the Case set forth in the Brief of Appellee filed herein on 
behalf of Park City. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Whaley/Reif s nuisance claims are barred as a matter of law in that the 
complained of outdoor music performances were conducted in compliance with a 
permit duly issued by Park City. Alternatively, Whaley/Reif have failed to establish 
all of the necessary elements for a private cause of action for public nuisance 
(failure to establish (1) the complained of conduct affects three or more people, 
(2) special injury unique to Whaley/Reif, and (3) necessary fault element), statutory 
private nuisance (as a matter of law the undisputed facts cannot support a finding of 
private nuisance) and common law nuisance (failure to establish that the outdoor 
music performances constitute both a (1) substantial and (2) unreasonable 
interference with the private use and enjoyment of Whaley/Reif s land). 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Whaley/Reif s 
repetitive motions for reconsideration because there was no reasonable basis for 
reconsidering the trial court's prior rulings, Whaley/Reif should not be allowed to 
present their arguments in piecemeal fashion, and in any event Whaley/Reif have an 
adequate remedy as a result of their appeal of the subject trial court's rulings. 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment before answers were 
filed on behalf of Park City, MTS and the Arts Council (an answer was filed on 
behalf of Barton) because Whaley/Reif have failed to explain how the filing of an 
answer would have assisted Whaley/Reif in opposing the motions for summary 
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judgment. Over the four and half years that this matter was pending before the trial 
court until a final appealable order was entered, Whaley/Reif made no attempts to 
conduct discovery, Whaley/Reif did not make a proper Rule 56(f) request to 
conduct discovery prior to the trial court ruling on the motions for summary 
judgment, and even after a repeated colloquy between Attorney Cline and Judge 
Hilder at the January 19, 2004 hearing, Attorney Cline could not identify what facts 
or information Whaley/Reif hoped to discover if they were permitted to conduct 
discovery. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering Barton's 
supplement affidavit rather than striking it. Barton's supplemental affidavit merely 
clarified previous statements made by Barton and did not contradict any previous 
statements made by Barton. Whaley/Reif were not prejudiced by the trial court's 
consideration of Barton's supplemental affidavit in that they had an opportunity to 
respond to such supplemental affidavit. Judicial economy warranted consideration 
of Barton's supplemental affidavit in order to avoid a subsequent motion for 
summary judgment raising the same matters set forth in the supplemental affidavit. 
Based upon the record herein, the trial court's findings that Barton did not 
contribute to the nuisance complained of by Whaley/Reif during 1999 are not 
clearly erroneous in that such findings are not contrary to the great weight of 
evidence but rather such findings are entirely consistent with the great weight of 
actual evidence in the record. 
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Because Whaley/Reif have not prevailed on any of their claims herein, 
Whaley/Reif are not entitled to an award of costs herein, but rather Park City, 
Barton, MTS and the Arts Council are each entitled to an award of their costs 
incurred on appeal pursuant to the provisions of Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE NUISANCE CLAIMS. 
A, Municipal ordinance bars nuisance claims. 
As discussed more fully by Park City in relation to the other issues on appeal 
herein, which arguments are incorporated herein by reference pursuant to Rule 24(i) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, in light of the fact that the complained of 
outdoor music performances were conducted pursuant to and in compliance with a 
permit duly issued by Park City in accordance with its Outdoor Music Ordinance, 
Whaley/Reif s nuisance claims are barred as a matter of law regardless of the 
underlying facts with respect to such outdoor music performances. 
Even if this Court determines that the Park City Outdoor Music Ordinance 
does not supersede and control over the common law and statutory nuisance 
provisions, as discussed more fully below Whaley/Reif s claims are still barred as a 
matter of law. "It is well-settled that an appellate court may affirm a trial court's 
ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court relied on some other 
ground." DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). 
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B. Failure to establish necessary elements of nuisance claims. 
Although it is true, as Whaley/Reif assert, that "the moving party bears the 
burden of proof on its summary judgment motion, viz. that there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law," 
it is also true that "in opposing a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff still 
has the ultimate burden of proving all the elements of his or her cause of action." 
Gerbich v. Numedlnc. 1999 UT 37, ^  12, 977 P.2d 1205. 
1, No public nuisance pursuant to Utah Code § 76-10-803. 
Whaley/Reif have attempted to assert a private cause of action under the 
public nuisance statute. However, there are three elements of such cause of action 
that Whaley/Reif cannot satisfy, and the failure of any one of these elements is fatal 
to Whaley/Reif s private cause of action. 
a. Complained of conduct affects less than three people. 
Section 76-10-803(1) of the Utah Code plainly states that in order to 
constitute a public nuisance, the particular act or omission must: 
(a) annoy[], injure[], or endanger[] the comfort, repose, health or safety of 
three or more persons; 
(e) [or] in any way render[] three or more persons insecure in life or the use 
of property. 
There is no evidence in the record that the complained of outdoor music 
performances annoyed, injured, or endangered the comfort, repose, health or safety 
of three or more persons, nor that such performances rendered three or more 
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persons insecure in life or the use of property. At best, Whaley/Reif have only 
alleged that the outdoor music performances adversely impacted two discrete 
individuals—Whaley and Reif. This undisputed fact in and of itself bars 
Whaley/Reif s claim of a public nuisance as a matter of law. 
b. No special injury unique to Whaley/Reif. 
The typical response to a public nuisance is that a public official redresses 
violations of the public nuisance statute through an action for abatement. Erickson 
v. Sorensen, 877 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah Ct App. 1994); see also, W. Page Keeton et 
al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 90, at 643 (5th ed. 1984); UTAH 
CODE Ann. 76-10-806 (2001). A private individual may, however, have a cause of 
action under this statute, but only if he or she has suffered some substantial injury or 
damage not inflicted on the community at large. Id. at 148; see also, Hardy Salt Co. 
v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 501 F.2d 1156, 1164 (10th Cir. 1974). 
[The] public nuisance doctrine was not originally intended to create a 
private cause of action for damages, which might otherwise be 
pursued under the doctrines of private nuisance and negligence. 
Rather, private actions premised on public nuisances are an exception 
to the public nuisance doctrine, which courts will allow, only 
reluctantly, if the requirements of special injury and fault are met. 
Erickson, 877 P.2d at 150, n.5. 
Whaley/Reif have simply not suffered any special injury or substantial 
damage not inflicted on the community at large (including other residents within the 
same neighborhood in which Whaley/Reif reside), and there is no evidence in the 
record of any such special injury or substantial damage. 
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c. No fault exists as required for private cause of action. 
Assuming, arguendo, Whaley/Reif could establish a special injury different 
from that of society at large, in order to pursue a private cause of action for 
nuisance Whaley/Reif must also establish that either (1) the complained of conduct 
constitutes a nuisance per se or (2) the conduct is unreasonable under the 
circumstances. Erickson, 877 P.2d at 148-149. 
To constitute a nuisance per se, the conduct creating the nuisance must be 
expressly proscribed by statute; it is not enough to demonstrate that a nuisance 
statute has been violated. Id. at 149. "Mere violation of the public nuisance statute 
does not constitute nuisance per se." Id. at 149. In the instant case, the complained 
of conduct was not prohibited by statute, but rather it was expressly permitted by 
Park City's Outdoor Music Ordinance. 
In order to recover for public nuisance on the theory that the complained of 
conduct was unreasonable, Whaley/Reif must specifically demonstrate that the 
complained of conduct was intentional, negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous. Id. at 
149. "Absent a showing that defendant's actions fell within one of these four 
categories, plaintiff cannot recover for his injuries in a private action, even though 
no such culpability is required to establish a public nuisance as such and trigger 
entitlement to abatement remedies." Id. at 149; see also Stroda v. State Highway 
Comm'n, 539 P.2d 1147,1150 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975). 
The conduct complained of in the instant case is not unreasonable as it was 
not intentional (i.e., not intended to inflict harm on Whaley/Reif, although the 
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outdoor music performance was intended to occur), negligent (the performances 
were conducted strictly in accordance with Park City's Outdoor Music Ordinance, 
which was carefully formulated with the intent of mitigating any adverse impact on 
the neighboring businesses and residences), reckless or ultrahazardous. 
d. No private cause of action for public nuisance. 
Whaley/Reif s conclusionary allegations of the essential elements of a 
private cause of action for public nuisance do not rise to the level of admissible 
factual evidence of such essential elements. There is simply no evidence in the 
record that establishes all of the necessary elements of a private cause of action for 
a public nuisance, and therefore judgment was appropriate as a matter of law 
regardless of the purported disputed facts Whaley/Reif have referenced. 
This Court should not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature. 
"[C]ourts traditionally have been reluctant to enjoin as a public nuisance activities 
which have been considered and specifically authorized by the government." 58 
AM. JUR. 2d Nuisances § 462 (1989). Courts should "interfere with such action 
only if it plainly appears that it is so lacking in propriety and reason that it must be 
deemed capricious and arbitrary, or is in excess of the authority of the legislative 
body." Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 493 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah 1972). In the instant 
case, Park City has not gone beyond its authority nor is the Outdoor Music 
Ordinance so lacking in propriety and reason to justify this Court substituting its 
judgment for that of Park City. 
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2. No private nuisance pursuant to Utah Code § 78-38-1. 
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and all other 
submissions show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The foregoing rule does not preclude summary judgment simply 
whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a material fact 
is genuinely controverted. 
Heglar Ranch Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980). 
Judge Hilder correctly pointed out that there are no material facts in dispute 
with respect to the nuisance claims. 
It is undisputed that Whaley/Reif have made subjective complaints about the 
volume of the outdoor musical performances. [R. 3-18; 753; passim] 
It is undisputed that Park City is a resort community. [R. 220-221; 236-237] 
It is undisputed that Whaley/Reif reside in Old Town, the heart of the Park 
City resort community. [R. 2-3; 220-221] 
It is undisputed that the subject neighborhood is zoned as Historic 
Commercial Business (notably not zoned as a residential area). [R. 221] 
It is undisputed that Whaley/Reif are the only individuals to complain about 
such musical performances, notwithstanding the fact that Whaley/Reif are not the 
only residents of Old Town. [R. 220; passim] 
It is undisputed that Whaley/Reif were the only individuals to oppose the 
outdoor musical performances at public hearings conducted by Park City, and that 
the many other residents in attendance at the public hearings were overwhelmingly 
in favor of outdoor musical performances. [R. 196-219; 222] 
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It is undisputed that within the Historic Commercial Business zoning district, 
noisy commercial operations, business and public master festivals and parades are 
common. [R. 221; 237] 
It is undisputed that the permits for the complained of outdoor musical 
performances limited the spectators to no more than 250 people (any gatherings in 
excess of 250 people require a separate Master Festival License). [R. 225; 242] 
It is undisputed that the complained of outdoor musical performances were 
initially not permitted to start until 12:00 Noon, which requirement was 
subsequently changed to 5:00 p.m., and were not permitted to continue past 8:00 
p.m. [R. 224; 240] 
It is undisputed that Park City even required the installation of a device that 
shuts of power to the stage and sound system at 8:00 p.m., thereby ensuring that 
music will not continue past 8:00 p.m. [R. 224; 240] 
It is undisputed that there is no evidence in the record of any decibel reading 
taken by any individual in excess of that permitted by the Outdoor Music 
Ordinance. [R. 224; 240; 242; 247-265;passim] 
It is undisputed that in enacting the Outdoor Music Ordinance, Park City 
expressly found that "outdoor music performances, because of their very nature, 
have a positive effect on both the existing businesses around them and the 
community at large, causing enhanced resort atmosphere and business patronage" 
and that the outdoor music "promotes the arts and cultural enhancement in the 
community." [R. 221; 237] 
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It is undisputed that with respect to the Outdoor Music Ordinance, Park City 
relied upon the recommendations of a University of Utah class concerning the 
effects and regulation of noise and the construction of sound-mitigating stages in 
order to substantially mitigate any harm that the outdoor music may cause the 
surrounding neighborhoods and businesses. [R. 220; 236] 
It is undisputed that with respect to the Outdoor Music Ordinance, Park City 
relied upon recommendations from a volunteer citizen committee (or task force) 
regarding the mitigation of any harm that the outdoor music may cause the 
surrounding neighborhoods and businesses. [R. 236] 
It is undisputed that "the Neighborhood Review Group, an independent 
review committee appointed to monitor ongoing compliance with Ordinance 00-36, 
delivered a positive recommendation and review of performance under the 
ordinance." [R. 237] 
Accordingly, as a matter of law, a finding of private nuisance pursuant to 
Section 78-38-1 of the Utah Code cannot be reasonably made based on the 
undisputed facts in this matter. 
3. No common law nuisance. 
The common law cause of action for nuisance was discussed at length in 
Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
A private nuisance is generally defined as a substantial and 
unreasonable nontrespassory interference with the private use and 
enjoyment of another's land. Sanfordv. University of Utah, 488 P.2d 
741, 744 (Utah 1971); Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198, 200 
(W. Va. 1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ON TORTS § 821D (1979)... 
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. A private nuisance action "has traditionally been restricted to 
invasions of interests in the use and enjoyment of land . . . As Prosser 
points out, "[t]he essence of a private nuisance is an interference with 
the use and enjoyment of land . . . . And without it, the fact of 
personal injury, or of interference with some purely personal right, is 
not enough for such a nuisance." W. Prosser & W. Keeton, PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON TORTS 619 & n. 1 (1984); see also Institoris v. City 
of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 418, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (a 
private nuisance can support recovery only for harm to a property 
interest, not for personal injury). 
M a t 942-943. 
In other words, in order for Whaley/Reif to successfully make a claim that 
the outdoor music performances constitute a common law nuisance, Whaley/Reif 
must establish that the outdoor music performances constitute both a (1) substantial 
and (2) unreasonable interference with the private use and enjoyment of their land. 
See Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1245 (Utah 1998). 
The insubstantial nature of the harm claimed by Whaley/Reif 
(notwithstanding Whaley/Reif s subjective exaggerations of the same) is 
highlighted by the undisputed facts set forth above with respect to the limited hours 
of the music performance, the limited days, the limited locations, the limited 
volume, etc. 
Whether or not the outdoor music performances constituted an unreasonable 
interference with Whaley/Reif s private use and enjoyment of their land has already 
been addressed above with respect to a public nuisance, with the inquiry being 
whether the complained of conduct was intentional, negligent, reckless or 
ultrahazardous. "An action for a private nuisance may rest on conduct that is 
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intentional and unreasonable, negligent or reckless, or that results in abnormally 
dangerous conditions or activities in an inappropriate place." Turnbaugh, 793 P.2d 
at 942. As discussed above, the outdoor musical performances were not intentional, 
negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous. 
Additionally, in evaluating the unreasonableness of a complained of activity, 
the Utah Supreme Court has explained "the degree of a defendant's interference in 
the use and enjoyment of plaintiff s land" must be weighed against "the 
reasonableness of the interference in the context of wider community interests." 
Walker Drug, 972 P.2d at 1245. Accordingly, the "severity of the harm" alleged 
must be evaluated in light of "its social value or utility." This very balancing act 
was conducted by Park City in fashioning its Outdoor Music Ordinance to mitigate 
as much as possible any adverse impact on the neighboring businesses and 
residences in light of the admitted benefit to the community and public as a whole 
from such outdoor music performances. 
Based upon the undisputed facts as discussed more fully above, Judge Hilder 
was able to properly determine as a matter of law that the complained of outdoor 
music performances did not constitute a substantial and unreasonable interference 
with Whaley/Reif s enjoyment of their property. See Twenty-Second Corp. of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Oregon Short Line J?. Co., 103 P. 
243, 245-250 (Utah 1909) (reversing a finding of nuisance in circumstances 
involving the operation of fourteen railroad tracks in close proximity to a structure 
used for religious and secular activities on Sunday and other days of the week 
-14-
notwithstanding the allegations that "the noises emanating from the engines . . . 
disturbed the meetings . . . and caused great annoyances to the speakers and singers, 
and at times interfered with the music and was a great annoyance to those in 
attendance at the meetings"). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO RECONSIDER 
REPETITIVE ARGUMENTS. 
Pursuant to Rule 54(b), whenever a claim against any party remains pending, 
it is within the trial court's discretion to reconsider any previous ruling made with 
respect to any claim or any other party. See Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 
P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, even if the trial court has a 
compelling reason to reconsider, it is not necessarily forced to reconsider upon 
motion by a party to the litigation. Id. at 1311. 
Even when a denial of a motion for reconsideration is challenged on appeal, 
the determinative fact is whether there were material facts presented that would 
change the outcome of the trial court's denial. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 
1185 (Utah 1993). If no new material facts have come to light subsequent to the 
prior ruling, then there is no error in the trial court's denial of a motion for 
reconsideration. Id. 
In the present case the trial court properly denied Whaley/Reif s motion for 
reconsideration because there were simply no new material facts that would change 
the outcome of the prior entry of summary judgment, yet Whaley/Reif persisted in 
repeatedly filing duplicative motions to reconsider rather than actively conducting 
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discovery (as discussed in more detail in response to other issues on appeal) in an 
effort to produce new material facts. 
Particularly in light of Judge Hilder's ruling that Park City's Outdoor Music 
Ordinance preempted and barred any claim for nuisance based on activities 
expressly permitted by such ordinance, even if new, admissible, material facts had 
been presented (which did not happen), they would not have changed the outcome 
of Judge Hilder's prior ruling. 
Judge Hilder correctly noted that the efficient resolution of cases cannot 
condone the piecemeal approach to briefing that Whaley/Reif employed with 
respect to the motions for summary judgment that were initially granted. Ruling 
and Order, Dated March 31, 2003, at p. 2. [R. 878] See United States v. Coleman, 
131 F.3d 152 (10th Cir. 1997) {unpublished opinion) ("Restrictions on [repetitive 
motions] . . . exist to prevent a [party] . . . from presenting his arguments piecemeal, 
through a series of motions—rather than in an initial, comprehensive motion."). 
Whaley/Reif do not get repeated bites at the apple simply because they believe that 
they failed to do an adequate job in presenting their arguments for purposes of the 
initial determination by the trial court. 
In any event, any harm suffered by Whaley/Reif as a result of the trial 
court's refusal to reconsider its initial grant of summary judgment can be adequately 
addressed on appeal of the original grant of summary judgment—if the grant of 
summary judgment is upheld, then no harm resulted from the trial court's refusal to 
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reconsider, and if the grant of summary judgment is reversed on appeal then 
Whaley/Reif have been afforded an adequate remedy. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BEFORE ALL ANSWERS WERE FILED OR 
DISCOVERY WAS CONDUCTED. 
First of all, it is noteworthy that the reason no answers were filed on behalf 
of Park City, MTS and the Arts Council is that a motion for summary judgment was 
filed on behalf of each of these parties as their responsive pleading to 
Whaley/Reif s complaint, which motions were granted without the need to file an 
answer. Whaley/Reif have failed to even attempt to explain how the filing of an 
answer on behalf of these parties would have assisted Whaley/Reif in defending 
against the respective motions for summary judgment. 
An answer was filed on behalf of Barton on November 21, 2002 (after his 
motion for summary judgment failed to dispose of all claims against him 
individually). [R. 801-804] 
Whaley/Reif s initial Complaint in this matter was filed on May 1, 2001. [R. 
1] More than two and a half years later, Judge Hilder noted: 
The court does not understand plaintiffs' repeated assertion that 
discovery could not be pursued because various (indeed, many) 
motions were filed through the first two-plus years of this case's life. 
An attorney's planning meeting and a discovery schedule were 
required, but why could not that have occurred, concurrently with the 
progress of the many motions? Even if that is a valid concern, by the 
date of argument on Mr. Barton's last Motion for Summary Judgment, 
plaintiffs had NO admissible evidence on the critical issues, and 
despite repeated colloquy between counsel and the court, plaintiffs 
could not identify what they might find if the court treated their 
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discovery concern as a Rule 56(f) request for time to pursue 
discovery. 
Minute Entry and Order, January 19, 2004, at p. 1. [R. 1267] 
The final appealable Ruling and Order was entered in this matter on October 
8, 2005 [R. 1420-1421], nearly four and a half years after the date Whaley/Reif first 
filed their Complaint herein. During the four and a half years that this matter was 
pending in the trial court, Whaley/Reif failed to initiate an attorney's planning 
meeting for purposes of establishing a scheduling order (which was their burden to 
do as set forth in UTAH R. CIV. PROC. Rule 26(f)(1)), and failed to make any 
attempts to conduct any manner of discovery. However, during that same period of 
time, Whaley/Reif filed a petition seeking permission to appeal an interlocutory 
order [R. 759-792], filed no less than four (and arguably more) motions for 
reconsideration and/or certification as a final appealable judgment [R. 805-833; 
851-876; 880-890; 1151-1176; 1313-1325; 1342-1354], and filed a premature 
appeal [R. 1297-1298; 1306-1307]. 
"An attorney has a professional responsibility to 'act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client.' See UTAH RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.3. Therefore, an attorney has a responsibility to 
use the available discovery procedures to diligently represent [his or] her client. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide the means to do this." Brown v. Glover, 
2000 UT 89, % 30, 16 P.3d 540. "Therefore, the burden is on the discovering party 
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to be diligent in using the available procedures to obtain discovery . . . . " Id. at f^ 
32. 
Whaley/Reif were afforded ample opportunity to conduct discovery if they 
chose to do so, but they and their attorney (and it is noteworthy that Reif is an 
attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah) simply failed to fulfill their duty 
to act with reasonable diligence, and they should not now be permitted to benefit 
from their intentional decision not to pursue discovery in a timely manner. 
It is true that Attorney Cline submitted an affidavit that could potentially be 
construed as a Rule 56(f) request for time to conduct discovery. [R. 1164-1176] 
However, even that affidavit falls far short of the requirements of Rule 56(f). 
"Rule 56(f) allows the opposing party to submit an affidavit stating the 
reasons 'he is presently unable to present evidentiary affidavits essential to support 
his opposition to summary judgment.'" Aspenwood, LLC. v. CA.T., LLC, 2003 
UT App. 28, f 199 73 P.3d 947 (quoting Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 
P.2d 275, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). In denying the request for an opportunity to 
conduct further discovery (which denial was upheld on appeal), 
The trial court found that [the opposing party] failed to present any 
affidavit or statement by counsel of "what [was] being sought [in 
discovery].. ., that would lead to a basis for responding to the motion 
for summary judgment." The court further found that after [the] 
motion was filed, [the opposing party's] "priorities have not been to 
try to establish criteria to dispute the motion for summary judgment, 
but rather to pursue other matters . . . ." The record amply supports 
the trial court's findings. 
MatTf20. 
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The above statement from Aspenwood could easily have been written 
verbatim by Judge Hilder with respect to the facts of this case. Attorney Cline's 
affidavit failed to set forth what was being sought in discovery that would lead to a 
basis for opposing the pending motion for summary judgment (and, as noted in his 
January 19, 2004 Minute Entry and Order, Judge Hilder was unable to discern such 
a purpose even after his colloquy with Attorney Cline during oral argument), and 
the record establishes that Whaley/Reif s priorities have not been to establish 
criteria to dispute the motion for summary judgment, but rather to pursue other 
matters (such as repeated motions for reconsideration and/or certification). 
In light of Whaley/Reif s dilatory conduct in not even attempting to conduct 
discovery over a number of years, Judge Hilder did not abuse his discretion in 
refusing to grant further time to conduct discovery. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY REFUSING TO STRIKE 
BARTON'S SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT, 
Barton's supplemental affidavit was submitted merely to clarify the meaning 
of a phrase submitted in Barton's original affidavit. In his original affidavit, Barton 
states, "In the summer of 1999,1 was approached by Park City Brewing Company 
& Smokehouse and asked to provide sound and to book musicians for the 
restaurant." Affidavit of Randy Barton, dated June 12, 2001,16 at p. 2 (emphasis 
added). [R. 913] The word "provide" is vague and could imply a wide array of 
scenarios. 
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Consequently, in order to dispel any confusion surrounding the word 
"provide", Barton submitted a supplemental affidavit clarifying what Barton 
actually did to "provide sound" in that Barton "rented sound equipment to Park City 
Brewing Company & Smokehouse in exchange for food." Supplement to Affidavit 
of Randy Barton, dated June 5, 2003, Tf 2, at p. 2 (emphasis added). [R. 1083] 
Barton's supplemental affidavit establishes that the word "provide" in any of 
Barton's prior statements means that he "rented" sound equipment to Park City 
Brewing Company & Smokehouse. Barton's supplemental affidavit raises no new 
issues, but seeks only to clarify statements previously made by Barton that were 
somewhat vague and required further elaboration. 
At the outset, it is noteworthy that the only arguments raised by Whaley/Reif 
at the trial court level with respect to Barton's supplemental affidavit were (1) that 
consideration of Barton's supplemental affidavit by the trial court was inappropriate 
because such a supplemental affidavit is not expressly provided for under the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and (2) 
Whaley/Reif claimed that Barton's supplemental affidavit contradicted his prior 
affidavit. [R. 1119-1129] Accordingly, all of the other arguments raised in 
summary fashion by Whaley/Reif on appeal regarding this issue have been asserted 
for the first time on appeal and therefore should be disregarded in their entirety. 
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 13, 95 P.3d 276 ("[I]n general, appellate courts will 
not consider an issue . . . raised for the first time on appeal. . . ."). 
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Notwithstanding the lack of an express reference to supplemental pleadings 
in the applicable court rules, striking Barton's supplemental affidavit would 
frustrate the judicial economy of the proceedings because the clarification 
accomplished by Barton's supplemental affidavit could be accomplished simply by 
filing another motion for summary judgment. In Trillium USA, Inc. v. Board of 
County Commissioners, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that "as a matter of judicial 
economy, where there is no prejudice (i.e., where the opposing party is able to 
respond) and where the issues could be raised simply by filing a separate motion to 
dismiss, the trial court has discretion to consider arguments raised for the first time 
in a reply memorandum." 2001 UT 101, ^ 17 fn. 3, 37 P.3d 1093. Requiring 
duplicative motions would only cost the judicial system and each of the respective 
parties valuable time, money, and resources when the same net result is achieved by 
consideration of Barton's supplemental affidavit in the context of the original 
motion for summary judgment. 
Furthermore, Whaley/Reif were not prejudiced in any way by the trial 
court's consideration of Barton's supplemental affidavit because Whaley/Reif had a 
reasonable opportunity to respond to Barton's supplemental affidavit if they deemed 
it to be necessary, and Barton's counsel expressly stated on the record prior to the 
trial court's decision on Barton's motion for summary judgment that Whaley/Reif 
should be given an opportunity to respond to the supplemental affidavit as they 
deemed necessary. [R. 1135] 
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As explained above, there is no contradiction between Barton's initial 
affidavit and his supplemental affidavit, but rather the supplemental affidavit 
merely clarifies a statement from the initial affidavit. In Appellants' Brief, 
Whaley/Reif have failed to even attempt to explain the purported contradiction 
between the two affidavits. 
It is true that in the trial court proceedings, Whaley/Reif claimed that 
Barton's supplemental affidavit contradicted prior statements made by Barton in 
newspaper articles. One of the newspaper articles referenced by Whaley/Reif was a 
letter to the editor from Barton. However, again the letter uses the phrase "provided 
the sound amplification for Park City Brewing Company & Smokehouse." More 
Music, Less Talk, Park Record, Sept. 1, 1999, at A-15 (emphasis added). [R. 1026] 
Barton's supplemental affidavit clarifies the meaning of "provided" to mean "rented 
sound equipment" and poses no contradiction to his statement in the letter to the 
editor. The other newspaper articles cited as contradicting Barton's supplemental 
affidavit deserve no attention in that they constitute hearsay and carry no legal 
weight in a court of law. However, even if these articles are considered by the 
court, they too use the word "provide", and the meaning of "provide" has been 
clarified by way of Barton's supplemental affidavit to mean "rented sound 
equipment." Therefore, there is no contradiction between Barton's supplemental 
affidavit and Barton's prior statements. 
Finally, as discussed in more detail with respect to other issues on appeal, 
Whaley/Reif didn't really make a proper request to the trial court for a period of 
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time to conduct discovery before responding to Barton's motion for summary 
judgment, and even if the pleadings on file were construed as a request to conduct 
discovery the trial court properly denied such request in that there was no showing 
whatsoever by Whaley/Reif as to what they intended or hoped to discover as a 
result of such additional discovery, and there was no justifiable excuse for 
Whaley/Reif s failure to previously conduct discovery. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WITH RESPECT TO 
BARTON'S CONDUCT SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. 
At the outset, it is noteworthy that the bulk of the purported evidence that 
Whaley/Reif claim contradicts the trial court's findings consists of inadmissible 
hearsay that carries no legal weight in a court of law and cannot be considered for 
purposes of determining whether the trial court's finding is indeed clearly 
erroneous. 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expressly states: 
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." 
"Statements made merely on information and belief will be disregarded. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony that would not be admissible if testified to at the 
trial may not properly be set forth in an affidavit." Walker v. Rocky Mountain 
Recreation Corp., 508 P.3d 538, 542 (Utah 1973). 
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Paragraph Nos. 3. 5 6. ~, £, uy H* ai -: . : on pages 64-tu oi \ppellants' 
Brief continue wiadnn> -I!MC hearsay and/oi unsubstantiated conclusionary 
allegations with no pi ope: i facti ml si ippoi t tl ic: i: efor I lie remaining facts refei ei iced 
by Whaley/Reif are not really coniradictory to the "trial court's finding as explained 
more full> above (such a:^  i iarum > initial Affidavit and his letter to the editor 
published in the ParkR ecord being consistent x \ .11:1 :t Bai toe's si lpplemental 
affidavit). 
Based upon the record herein the H~l courts findings that Barton did not 
contribii ^- -i \ • . H *. K. \ : u v- J^C nol 
clearly erroneous in ihai ndi Undings arc not eontrur> lo the great weight uf 
evidence bul rather -uch undings are entirch" consistent v< ith the great weight of 
actual e\ iduice in llic nvnrd. 
VI. WHALEY/REIF ARE NOT ENTITLED TO COSTS 
Because Whaley/Reif have not prevailed on am" 4-r>hen .Jaims herein, 
Wltalcy/Reii'are no( entitled to an avian! ol tests IIUUIU mu IUUIL-I J ark City, 
Barton, M IS and the Arts Council are each entitled to an award of their costs 
incurred on appeal pursuant to the provisions of Rule 34 of ihe : lah Rules of 
Appellate Proaxltiit, 
On remand, the trial court should be instructed to \\\\ ard '\ ppellees then* costs 
incurred herein on appeal 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, and the arguments submitted on behalf 
of Park City Municipal Corporation, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment on all claims asserted by Whaley/Reif. 
Dated this 29th day of October, 2007. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON 
Dwayne A. Vance 
Christina Inge Miller 
Counsel for Randy Barton d/b/a The 
Wooden Dog, Mountain Town Stages and 
Park City/Summit County Arts Council 
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